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Abstract
The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied
in the literature [6, 22, 15], partly because of the inherent appeal of the problem,
partly because of the elegance of the associated structures and algorithms, and partly
because of important practical applications, such as the National Resident Matching
Program [20] and similar large-scale matching schemes. Here, we present the first
comprehensive study of variants of the problem in which the preference lists of the
participants are not necessarily complete and not necessarily totally ordered. We
show that, under surprisingly restrictive assumptions, a number of these variants are
hard, and hard to approximate. The key observation is that, in contrast to the case
where preference lists are complete or strictly ordered (or both), a given problem
instance may admit stable matchings of different sizes. In this setting, examples of
problems that are hard are: finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size,
determining whether a given pair is stable – even if the indifference takes the form of
ties on one side only, the ties are at the tails of lists, there is at most one tie per list,
and each tie is of length 2; and finding, or approximating, both an ‘egalitarian’ and
a ‘minimum regret’ stable matching. However, we give a 2-approximation algorithm
for the problems of finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size. We also
discuss the significant implications of our results for practical matching schemes.
Keywords: Stable Marriage problem; Indifference; Ties; NP-completeness; Approximation algo-
rithms
1 Introduction
An instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem (SM) involves n men and n women,
each of whom ranks all the members of the opposite sex in strict order of preference. A
matching M in I is a one-one correspondence between the men and women. We say that
a (man,woman) pair (m, w) blocks M , or is a blocking pair with respect to M , if m prefers
w to pM (m), and w prefers m to pM (w), where pM (q) denotes the partner of q in M . A
matching that admits no blocking pair is said to be stable. It is known that every instance
of SM admits at least one stable matching, and that such a matching can be found in
O(n2) time using the Gale/Shapley algorithm [3].
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1
Incomplete preference lists
A generalisation of SM occurs when the preference lists of those involved can be incomplete.
In this case, we say that person p is acceptable to person q if p appears on the preference
list of q, and unacceptable otherwise. We use SMI to stand for this variant of SM where
preference lists may be incomplete. A matching M in an instance I of SMI is a one-
one correspondence between a subset of the men and a subset of the women, such that
(m, w) ∈ M implies that each of m, w is acceptable to the other. The revised notion of
stability may be defined as follows: M is stable if there is no (man,woman) pair (m, w),
each of whom is either unmatched in M and finds the other acceptable, or prefers the
other to his/her partner in M 1. (It follows from this definition that, from the point of
view of finding stable matchings, we may assume, without loss of generality, that p is
acceptable to q if and only if q is acceptable to p.) A stable matching in I need not be
a complete matching. However, all stable matchings in I have the same size, and involve
exactly the same men and exactly the same women [4]. It is a simple matter to extend
the Gale/Shapley algorithm to cope with preference lists that may be incomplete (see [6,
Section 1.4.2]).
We shall refer to the classical many-one generalisation of the (one-one) problem SMI,
which is relevant in a number of important applications, as the Hospitals / Residents
problem (HR) [6, 22]. An instance I of HR involves a set of residents and a set of
hospitals, each resident seeking a post at one hospital, and the ith hospital having ci
posts. Each resident strictly ranks a subset of the hospitals, and each hospital strictly
ranks its applicants. A matching M in I is an assignment of each resident to at most one
hospital so that, for each i, at most ci residents are assigned to the ith hospital. Matching
M is stable if there is no (resident,hospital) pair (r, h) such that (i) r, h find each other
acceptable, (ii) r is either unassigned or prefers h to his assigned hospital, and (iii) h either
has an unfilled post or prefers r to at least one of the residents assigned to it. Again, the
Gale/Shapley algorithm may be extended to find a stable matching for a given instance of
HR [6, Section 1.6.3]. Also, analogous to the SMI case, every stable matching in I has the
same size, matches exactly the same set of residents, and fills exactly the same number of
posts at each hospital. (This is known as the ‘Rural Hospitals Theorem’ [20, 4, 21].) Note
that, in an instance of HR, it is not necessary for the numbers of residents and hospital
posts to be equal; however, for simplicity we assume in this paper that the numbers of
men and women are equal in an SMI instance.
Ties in the preference lists
An alternative natural extension of the original stable marriage problem arises when each
person need not rank all members of the opposite sex in strict order. Some of those involved
might be indifferent among certain members of the opposite sex, so that preference lists
may involve ties2. We use SMT to stand for the variant of SM in which preference lists
are complete but may include ties. In this context, a matching M is stable if there is no
(man,woman) pair (m, w), each of whom strictly prefers the other to his/her partner in
M . Note that this stability criterion is referred to as weak stability in [10], where two
other notions of stability are formulated for SMT. However, of the three definitions, it is
weak stability which has received the most attention in the literature [20, 18, 19, 14]. We
1Implicitly here, and henceforth for other stability definitions, such a pair (m, w) is defined to block M ,
or to be a blocking pair with respect to M , as for the SM case.
2In this paper, we restrict attention to the case where the indifference takes the form of ties in the
preference lists, but it may be verified that all results are extendable to the general case where the preference
lists are arbitrary partial orders.
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are concerned exclusively with weak stability in this paper, and henceforth for brevity, the
term stability will be used to indicate weak stability when ties are present.
By breaking the ties arbitrarily, an instance I of SMT becomes an instance I ′ of SM,
and it is clear that a stable matching for I ′ is also a stable matching for I. Thus a stable
matching for I can be found using the Gale/Shapley algorithm. (Conversely, given a stable
matching M in I, it is not difficult to see that there is an instance IM of SM in which M
is stable. Hence a matching M is stable in I if and only if M is stable in some instance of
SM obtained from I by breaking the ties.)
Ties and incomplete preference lists
In this paper, we focus on the variant of the stable marriage problem, denoted SMTI,
which incorporates both extensions described above. Thus an instance I of SMTI comprises
preference lists, each of which may involve ties and/or be incomplete. A combination of
the earlier definitions indicates that a matching M in I is stable if there is no (man,woman)
pair (m, w), each of whom is either unmatched in M and finds the other acceptable, or
strictly prefers the other to his/her partner in M .
As observed above, all stable matchings for a given instance of SMI are of the same
size, and all stable matchings for a given instance of SMT are complete (and therefore
of the same size). However, for a given instance of SMTI, it is no longer the case that
all stable matchings need be of the same size. This fact does not appear to have been
noted explicitly in the literature previously. We give a simple example to illustrate this
in Section 2. Analogous observations apply if we introduce the possibility of ties into HR
— we refer to this problem as HRT (Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties) [13]. The
stability criterion for HRT may be defined by substituting ‘strictly prefers’ for ‘prefers’ in
parts (ii) and (iii) of the stability criterion for HR. Clearly SMTI is a special case of HRT
(in which every hospital has one post, and the numbers of posts and residents are equal).
The practical setting
As stable matchings in an SMTI instance may be of different sizes, the question arises as to
whether there exists an efficient algorithm to find a maximum cardinality stable matching
for a given instance of SMTI and/or HRT. This question has particular significance within
the context of matching residents to hospitals. As is current practice in the National
Resident Matching Program [20] in the U.S. and the Canadian Resident Matching Service
[1], hospitals must rank a possibly large number of applicants in strict order of preference.
However, it is unrealistic to expect large and popular hospitals to provide a strict ranking
of all of their applicants; they might be happier, say, to rank their favourite applicants,
and then group together the remainder at the tail of their list. In the recently-introduced
SPA (Scottish Pre-registration house officer Allocations) matching scheme [11, 16], any
hospital may indeed include a tie at the tail of its preference list, but all ties are broken
arbitrarily by the matching program so that the preference lists become strict. However,
the previous observation indicates that breaking the ties in different ways can affect the
sizes of the subsequent stable matchings. Since a prime objective is to match as many
residents as possible, it would be desirable to have a strategy to break the ties so as to
maximise the cardinality of the consequent stable matchings. In fact, as we shall show
in this paper, the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem is unlikely,
since a related decision problem turns out to be NP-complete, and the result holds for the
restrictions corresponding to this practical setting that we have described. However, we
give a 2-approximation algorithm for the maximisation problem.
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Egalitarian and minimum regret stable matchings
Related stable matching problems which also have applications to centralised matching
schemes involve finding ‘fair’ stable matchings which maximise the overall ‘happiness’
of the participants in some sense. To be more precise, let I be an instance of SMT
and let M be a stable matching in I. For a person q in I, define cM (q), the cost of
M for q, to be the ranking (possibly joint ranking, if ties are involved) of pM (q) in q’s
preference list. For example, if some woman w has preference list3 m2 (m1 m3) m4 in
I, then cM (w) = 1, 2, 2, 4 if w’s partner in M is m2, m1, m3, m4 respectively
4. Let U
and W denote the set of men and women in I respectively, and denote by w(M) the
weight of M , where w(M) =
∑
q∈U∪W
cM (q); similarly denote by r(M) the regret of M ,
where r(M) = max
q∈U∪W
cM (q). Define an egalitarian (respectively minimum regret) stable
matching to be one whose weight (respectively regret) is minimum, taken over all stable
matchings.
It is known that if I contains no ties (and is therefore an instance of SM), then each
of the problems of finding an egalitarian stable matching and a minimum regret stable
matching is polynomial-time solvable [12, 5]. However in this paper we show that, for
an arbitrary instance of SMT, both of these problems are NP-hard, and are hard to
approximate.
Related work
Ronn [18, 19] was possibly the first to study stable matching problems with ties in the
preference lists from an algorithmic point of view. Among other things, he proved that
the Stable Roommates problem (the non-bipartite extension of Stable Marriage), although
solvable in polynomial time when all preference lists are strict [8], becomes NP-complete
when ties are permitted. As previously mentioned, Irving [10] studied SMT, but primarily
under two alternative definitions of stability to the one used here. Recently, Iwama et al.
[14] have also investigated SMT and SMTI, and present two reductions proving the NP-
completeness of the problem of deciding whether a given SMTI instance has a complete
stable matching. However, both reductions introduce instances containing ties of length
at least three, and ties on both sides. Also, it is shown that, for an SMT instance of size
n, it is hard to approximate an egalitarian stable matching within a factor of n1−ε, for
any ε > 0. But again, the constructed instance contains ties of length at least three, and
ties on both sides.
Summary of results
In this section, we outline the organisation of the remainder of this paper. The following
list indicates the main results that we establish, some of which have already been discussed
in greater detail. (In what follows, the reader should bear in mind that SMT is a special
case of SMTI, which in turn is a special case of HRT.)
1. In contrast to the case where preference lists are strictly ordered or complete (or
both), a single instance of SMTI may admit stable matchings of different sizes (Sec-
tion 2).
3In a preference list throughout this paper, persons within round brackets are tied.
4For the egalitarian and minimum regret stable matching problems, the cost of a matching for a person
q whose preference list is partially ordered may be defined as follows. Assume that ≺q denotes q’s list,
where r ≺q s if and only if q strictly prefers r to s. Then cM (q) is 1 plus the number of predecessors in ≺q
of pM (q).
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2. For a given instance of SMTI, finding a stable matching of maximum, or minimum,
size is NP-hard, even in the highly constrained case where the ties occur at the tails
of lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length
2 (Section 2).
3. There is a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm to find a stable matching of
maximum, or minimum, size for a given instance of HRT; indeed, the maximum size
cannot exceed the minimum size by more than a factor of 2 (Section 2).
4. For a given instance of SMT, determining whether a given (man, woman) pair is
stable, i.e. whether they can be paired in a stable matching, is NP-complete, even
if the ties occur at the tails of lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie per
list, and each tie is of length 2 (Section 3).
5. For a given instance I of SMT, each of the problems of finding an egalitarian and
a minimum regret stable matching is NP-hard, and not approximable within n1−ε,
for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where n is the number of participants in I. Each of
these results holds even if the ties occur on one side only and each tie is of length 2
(Section 4).
2 Cardinality of stable matchings in SMTI
As a simple illustration of the fact that an SMTI instance can have stable matchings of
different sizes, consider the following instance involving two men, m1, m2, and two women,
w1, w2:
m1 : w1 w1 : (m1 m2)
m2 : w1 w2 w2 : m2
There are two stable matchings for this instance, namely {(m2, w1)}, of cardinality 1, and
{(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}, of cardinality 2.
In this section, we prove that the existence of algorithms to find a stable matching of
maximum or minimum cardinality for a given instance of SMTI is unlikely, under several
simultaneous restrictions. We also give an upper bound for how closely such matchings
can be efficiently approximated for HRT, and remark that there is an interpolation result
for stable matchings in SMTI.
Define the following decision problems:
Name: max (resp. min) cardinality smti.
Instance: n men and n women, preference list of women for each man, preference
list of men for each woman, and integer K ∈ Z+.
Question: Does the given instance admit a stable matching M with |M | ≥ K
(resp. |M | ≤ K)?
Name: minimum (resp. exact) maximal matching.
Instance: Graph G = (V, E) and integer K ∈ Z+.
Question: Does G have a maximal matching M with |M | ≤ K (resp. |M | = K)?
minimum maximal matching is NP-complete5, even for subdivision graphs6 [7].
5In fact Horton and Kilakos proved that minimum edge dominating set is NP-complete for this class
of graphs. The minimum edge dominating set problem is to determine, given a graph G = (V, E) and
an integer K ∈ Z+, whether G contains an edge dominating set of size at most K. A set of edges S is an
edge dominating set in G if every edge in E\S is adjacent to some edge in S. It is known that minimum
maximal matching and minimum edge dominating set are polynomially equivalent; indeed the size of
a minimum maximal matching of a given graph G is equal to the size of a minimum edge dominating set
of G [23].
6A subdivision graph G is a graph obtained from another graph G′ by replacing every edge in G′ by a
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2.1 Maximum cardinality stable matchings
We begin by proving that max cardinality smti is hard when the ties are on one side
only. The transformation begins from exact maximal matching, the NP-completeness
of which clearly follows from the corresponding result for minimum maximal matching.
Lemma 2.1. max cardinality smti is NP-complete, even if the ties occur on one side
only.
Proof. Clearly max cardinality smti is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we transform
from exact maximal matching for subdivision graphs. Let G = (V, E) and K ∈ Z+ be
an instance of this problem. Then G is the subdivision graph of some graph G′ = (V ′, E′),
so that V = V ′ ∪ E′ and
E = {{e, v} : e ∈ E ′ ∧ v ∈ V ′ ∧ v is incident to e in G′}.
Also G has a bipartition (U, W ), where U = E ′ and W = V ′. Thus every vertex in U
has degree 2 in G. Without loss of generality we may assume that G′ is connected and is
not a forest, so that |E ′| ≥ |V ′|, i.e., |U | ≥ |W |. Again without loss of generality, we may
assume that |U | = |W |. For if |U | = |W |+ r for some r > 0, then we may add r vertices
a1, . . . , ar to U , and 2r vertices b1, . . . , br, c1, . . . , cr to W , where ai is adjacent to bi and
ci for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ r). Clearly every vertex in the new set U has degree 2 in the new
graph, and G has a maximal matching of size K if and only if the transformed graph has
a maximal matching of size K+r. Finally, without loss of generality, we may assume that
K ≤ n, where n = |U | = |W |.
Let U = {m1, m2, . . . , mn} and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. We construct an instance
I of max cardinality smti as follows: let U ∪ U ′ ∪ X be the set of men, and let
W ∪ Y ∪ Z be the set of women, where U ′ = {m′1, m
′
2, . . . , m
′
n}, X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn−K},
Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yn}, and Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zn−K}. Assume that ji and ki are two sequences
such that ji < ki, {mi, wji} ∈ E and {mi, wki} ∈ E (1 ≤ i ≤ n). For any wj (1 ≤ j ≤ n),
let Mj contain the men mi such that {mi, wj} ∈ E, and let M
′
j contain the men m
′
i such
that {mi, wj} ∈ E and j = ki. Create a preference list for each person as follows:
mi : yi wji wki [women in Z] (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
m′i : yi wki (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
xi : [women in W ] (1 ≤ i ≤ n−K)
wj : (men in Mj ∪M
′
j) (x1 . . . xn−K) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
yj : (mj m
′
j) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
zj : (m1 . . .mn) (1 ≤ j ≤ n−K)
In a preference list throughout this paper, persons within square brackets are listed in
arbitrary strict order at the point where the symbol appears. Clearly the ties occur in the
women’s preference lists only. To complete the construction of the instance, we set the
target value to be K ′ = 3n − K. Clearly the maximum size of stable matching for this
instance is at most K ′. We claim that G has a maximal matching of size exactly K if and
only if the stable marriage instance admits a stable matching of size K ′.
For, suppose that G has a maximal matching M , where |M | = K. We construct a
matching M ′ in I as follows. For each edge {mi, wj} in M , if j = ji, then we add (mi, wji)
and (m′i, yi) to M
′ 7. If j = ki, then we add (m
′
i, wki) and (mi, yi) to M
′. There remain
path of length 2 in G.
7Note that, in this paper, we use (m, w) to denote a (man,woman) pair in a stable marriage instance,
and {m, w} to denote an edge connecting vertices m and w in a graph.
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2(n − K) men of the form mpi , m
′
pi
(1 ≤ i ≤ n − K) who are as yet unmatched. Add
(mpi , zi) and (m
′
pi
, ypi) to M
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ n−K). Similarly there remain n−K women of the
form wqi (1 ≤ i ≤ n−K) who are as yet unmatched. Add (xi, wqi) to M
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ n−K).
Clearly M ′ is a matching of size 2K + 2(n−K) + (n−K) = K ′.
It is straightforward to verify that no person in X∪Y ∪Z, can be involved in a blocking
pair of M ′. Similarly, neither can any man in U ′, since yi’s list is a single tie (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Also, no unmatched pair (mi, wj) blocks M
′. For if this occurs, then (mi, zk) ∈ M
′ for
some zk ∈ Z, and (xl, wj) ∈ M
′ for some xl ∈ X. Thus no edge of M is incident to mi or
wj in G. Hence M ∪ {{mi, wj}} is a matching in G, contradicting the maximality of M .
Thus M ′ is stable.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching for I, where |M ′| = K ′. Then
everybody has a partner in M ′. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), at most one of mi and m
′
i is
matched in M ′ to a woman in W , for otherwise yi is unmatched, a contradiction. Thus
M =
{
{mi, wj} ∈ E : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n ∧ ((mi, wj) ∈ M
′ ∨ (m′i, wj) ∈ M
′)
}
is a matching in G. There are exactly n−K men mri (1 ≤ i ≤ n−K) who have a partner
from Z in M ′. Since pM ′(m
′
ri
) = yri (1 ≤ i ≤ n−K), then |M | = K.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that M is maximal. For, suppose not. Then
there is some edge {mi, wj} in G such that no edge of M is incident to either mi or wj .
Thus (mi, zk) ∈ M
′ for some zk ∈ Z, and (xl, wj) ∈ M
′ for some xl ∈ X. But then
(mi, wj) blocks M
′, for mi strictly prefers wj to zk, and wj strictly prefers mi to xl. This
contradiction to the stability of M ′ implies that M is indeed maximal.
Thus max cardinality smti is NP-complete if each man’s preference list contains
no ties, and each woman’s preference list comprises either one tie or two ties. As a by-
product, the proof establishes NP-completeness for the question of whether a complete
stable matching exists in the constructed instance of SMTI (this fact will be used hence-
forth). We now demonstrate NP-completeness for max cardinality smti in the case
that the ties are at the tails of the lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie per
list, and each tie is of length 2. Our exposition is made simpler if we transform from max
cardinality smti when restricted to the case that each man’s preference list contains no
ties, and each woman’s preference list comprises two ties (a ‘tie’ can be of length 1 for this
purpose). To see that the problem remains NP-complete for this restriction, consider the
instance of max cardinality smti as constructed in the proof of Lemma 2.1. Clearly
the preference list of each woman in W comprises two ties, and the preference list of each
woman in Y ∪ Z comprises one tie. If ej is any woman in Y ∪ Z, then we append a new
man aj to her list. Create, in addition, a new man bj and two new women cj , dj . The
preference lists of the new persons are as follows:
aj : cj dj ej cj : aj bj
bj : dj cj dj : bj aj
Clearly (aj , cj) ∈ M and (bj , dj) ∈ M , for any stable matching M in the transformed
instance. In addition, every woman’s preference list in the transformed instance comprises
two ties (where a tie can be of length 1 in this case).
Theorem 2.2. max cardinality smti is NP-complete, even if the ties are at the tails
of the lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length
2.
Proof. Membership in NP was established in Lemma 2.1. To show NP-hardness, we
transform from the restricted version of max cardinality smti as discussed above, in
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which each man’s preference list contains no ties, each woman’s preference list comprises
two ties (where a tie can be of length 1), and the target value is equal to the number of
men. Let I be an instance of this problem, in which U = {m1, m2, . . . , mn} is the set of
men, and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} is the set of women. For each woman wj ∈ W , let M
h
j
(resp. M tj ) be the set of men tied at the head (resp. tail) of wj ’s list. Assume that
Mhj = {mkj,1 , mkj,2 , . . . , mkj,hj } and M
t
j = {mlj,1 , mlj,2 , . . . , mlj,tj }
for some hj > 0 and tj > 0. We form an instance I









∪ Y be the set of women
in I ′, where
Wj = {wj,r : 1 ≤ r ≤ hj + tj} (1 ≤ j ≤ n),
Xi = {xi,r : 1 ≤ r ≤ hi + ti} (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
and Y = {yj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n}.
For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), let W tj =
⋃r=hj+tj
r=hj+1
{wj,r}. We form the preference lists of the
persons in I ′ as follows. Each man in U initially has the same preference list in I ′ as in
I. Let mi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be given, and let wj be any woman who appears in mi’s list in
I. If mi ∈ M
h
j , then mi = mkj,a for some a (1 ≤ a ≤ hj); we replace wj by the women
in {wj,a} ∪W
t
j in any strict order in mi’s preference list in I
′. Otherwise, mi ∈ M
t
j , and
mi = mlj,b for some b (1 ≤ b ≤ tj); we replace wj by wj,b+hj in mi’s preference list in I
′.
The other preference lists in I ′ are as follows:
xi,r : (wi,r yi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ r ≤ hi + ti)
wj,r : xj,r mkj,r (1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ r ≤ hj)
wj,r+hj : xj,r+hj [men in M
h
j ] mlj,r (1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ r ≤ tj)
yj : [men in Xj ] (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
Clearly the ties occur in the men’s preference lists only, any tie forms the whole of the list
in which it appears, and each tie is of length 2. We claim that I has a stable matching in
which everybody is matched if and only if I ′ does (implicitly we set the target value in I ′
to be the number of men in I ′).
For, suppose that I has such a matching M . Let mi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be given, and let
wj = pM (mi). If mi ∈ M
h
j , then mi = mkj,a for some a (1 ≤ a ≤ hj). If mi ∈ M
t
j , then
mi = mlj,b for some b (1 ≤ b ≤ tj); let a = b + hj . In both cases, add the pairs (mi, wj,a),
(xj,r, wj,r) (for 1 ≤ r ≤ hj + tj , r 6= a), and (xj,a, yj) to M
′. Clearly M ′ is a complete
matching in I ′.
It is straightforward to verify that no man in Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and consequently no
woman in Y , can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′ in I ′. Now suppose that (mi, wj,a)
blocks M ′ in I ′. Then a > hj and mi ∈ M
h
j . Let mp = pM ′(wj,a); then mp = mlj,b , where
b = a− hj . Clearly (mi, wj,a) /∈ M
′, and also (mi, wj,r) /∈ M
′ (for 1 ≤ r ≤ hj + tj , r 6= a),
since (xj,r, wj,r) ∈ M
′. Thus pM ′(mi) 6∈ Wj , so that in I, mi strictly prefers wj to pM (mi).
Also, in I, wj strictly prefers mi to mp. Hence (mi, wj) blocks M in I, a contradiction.
Thus M ′ is stable in I ′.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I ′ in which everybody is matched.
Let j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) be given. Then pM ′(yj) = xj,a for some a (1 ≤ a ≤ hj + tj), and hence
pM ′(wj,a) = mi, for some mi ∈ U . Since pM ′(xj,r) = wj,r (for 1 ≤ r ≤ hj + tj , r 6= a),
then M ′ ∩ (U ×Wj) = {(mi, wj,a)}. Let mi be the partner of wj in M . Clearly M is a
complete matching in I.
Suppose that (mi, wj) blocks M in I. Let mp = pM (wj). Then in I, wj strictly prefers
mi to mp, so that mi ∈ M
h
j and mp ∈ M
t
j . Thus mp = mlj,b for some b (1 ≤ b ≤ tj), so
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that wj,a = pM ′(mp), where a = b + hj . Now in I
′, wj,a strictly prefers mi to mp. Also in
I ′, mi strictly prefers wj,a to pM ′(mi) (since pM (mi) 6= wj implies that pM ′(mi) /∈ Wj).
Thus (mi, wj,a) blocks M
′ in I ′, a contradiction. Hence M is stable in I.
2.2 Minimum cardinality stable matchings
It is also possible to establish the NP-completeness of min cardinality smti, in the case
that ties are at the tails of lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie per list,
and each tie is of length 2. We begin by demonstrating NP-completeness for the first two
restrictions holding simultaneously, using a similar transformation to the one in Lemma
2.1.
Lemma 2.3. min cardinality smti is NP-complete, even if the ties are at the tails of
lists and on one side only, and there is at most one tie per list.
Proof. Clearly min cardinality smti is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we transform from
minimum maximal matching for subdivision graphs. Let G = (V, E) and K ∈ Z+ be an
instance of this problem. Then G is the subdivision graph of some graph G′ = (V ′, E′),
so that V = V ′ ∪ E′ and
E = {{e, v} : e ∈ E ′ ∧ v ∈ V ′ ∧ v is incident to e in G′}.
Also G has a bipartition (U, W ), where U = E ′ and W = V ′. Thus every vertex in U
has degree 2 in G. As in Lemma 2.1, we may assume, without loss of generality, that
|U | = |W | = n, and K ≤ n.
Let U = {m1, m2, . . . , mn} and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. We construct an instance I of
min cardinality smti as follows: let U ∪U ′ be the set of men, and let W ∪Y be the set
of women, where U ′ = {m′1, m
′
2, . . . , m
′
n} and Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yn}. Assume that ji and
ki are two sequences such that ji < ki, {mi, wji} ∈ E and {mi, wki} ∈ E (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
For any wj (1 ≤ j ≤ n), let Mj (resp. M
′
j) contain the men mi (resp. m
′
i) such that
{mi, wj} ∈ E. Create a preference list for each person as follows:
mi : yi wji wki (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
m′i : yi wki wji (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
wj : (members of Mj and M
′
j) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
yj : (mj m
′
j) (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
Clearly the ties occur in the women’s preference lists only, and any tie forms the whole of
the list in which it appears. To complete the construction of I, we set the target value to
be K ′ = n + K. We claim that G has a maximal matching of size at most K if and only
if I admits a stable matching of size at most K ′.
For, suppose that G has a maximal matching M , where |M | = k ≤ K. We construct a
matching M ′ in I as follows. For each edge {mi, wj} in M , if j = ji, then we add (mi, wji)
and (m′i, yi) to M
′. If j = ki, then we add (m
′
i, wki) and (mi, yi) to M
′. There remain




M ′ (1 ≤ i ≤ n − k). Clearly M ′ is a matching of size 2k + (n − k) ≤ K ′. It remains to
show that M ′ is stable.
No woman in Y can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′, since every such woman is
matched in M ′. Additionally, no unmatched pair (mi, wj) blocks M
′. For if this occurs,
then each of mi and wj is unmatched in M
′, and thus no edge of M is incident to either
vertex in G. Hence M∪{{mi, wj}} is a matching in G, contradicting the maximality of M .
Finally, no unmatched pair (m′i, wj) blocks M
′, for either (m′i, yi) ∈ M
′ or (m′i, wki) ∈ M
′
holds. Thus M ′ is stable.
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Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching for I, where |M ′| = k′ ≤ K ′. For
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), yi is matched in M
′, for otherwise (mi, yi) blocks M
′, a contradiction.
Thus at most one of mi and m
′
i is matched in M
′ to a woman in W . Hence
M =
{
{mi, wj} ∈ E : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n ∧ ((mi, wj) ∈ M
′ ∨ (m′i, wj) ∈ M
′)
}
is a matching in G, and |M | = |M ′| − n = k′ − n ≤ K.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that M is maximal. For, suppose not. Then
there is some edge {mi, wj} in G such that no edge of M is incident to either mi or wj .
Thus m∗i and wj are both unmatched in M
′, where m∗i ∈ {mi, m
′
i}. Since each of m
∗
i , wj
finds the other acceptable, then (m∗i , wj) blocks M
′. This contradiction to the stability of
M ′ implies that M is indeed maximal.
By transforming from the NP-complete problem minimum maximal matching for
the subdivision graphs of graphs of maximum degree 3 [7], it may be verified that the
length of any tie in the instance of min cardinality smti constructed in Lemma 2.3 is
either 2, 4 or 6. We now show how to eliminate the ties of length greater than 2.
Theorem 2.4. min cardinality smti is NP-complete, even if the ties occur at the tails
of lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2.
Proof. Membership in NP was established in Lemma 2.3. To show NP-hardness, we
transform from the restricted version of min cardinality smti as discussed above, in
which each man’s preference list contains no ties, and each woman’s preference list com-
prises a tie of length either 2, 4 or 6. Let I be an instance of this problem, in which
U = {m1, m2, . . . , mn} is the set of men, W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} is the set of women, and
K ∈ Z+ is the target value. Without loss of generality, suppose that W ′ = {w1, w2, . . . , wt}
is the set of women, each of whom has a preference list comprising a tie of length 6. Let
W ′′ = W\W ′. For each woman wj ∈ W
′, let Mj be the set of men tied in wj ’s list.
Assume that
Mj = {mkj,1 , mkj,2 , . . . , mkj,6}.





the set of men in I ′, and let W ′′ ∪
(⋃j=t
j=1(Wj ∪Qj ∪ {sj})
)
be the set of women in I ′,
where Pj = {pj,l : 1 ≤ l ≤ 6}, Qj = {qj,l : 1 ≤ l ≤ 5}, Rj = {rj,l : 1 ≤ l ≤ 5}, and
Wj = {wj,l : 1 ≤ l ≤ 6}. We form the preference lists of the persons in I
′ as follows. Each
woman in W ′′ has the same preference list in I ′ as in I. Each man in U initially has the
same preference list in I ′ as in I. Now let mi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be given, and suppose that some
woman wj ∈W
′ appears in mi’s list in I. Replace wj by all the women in Wj in arbitrary
(strict) order in mi’s preference list in I
′. The other preference lists in I ′ are as follows,
for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ t):
pj,l : qj,l wj,l (1 ≤ l ≤ 5)
pj,6 : [women in Qj ] wj,6
qj,l : rj,l (pj,l pj,6) (1 ≤ l ≤ 5)
rj,l : sj qj,l (1 ≤ l ≤ 5)
sj : (rj,1 rj,2 rj,3 rj,4 rj,5)
wj,l : pj,l mkj,l [men in Mj\{mkj,l}] (1 ≤ l ≤ 6)
Clearly the ties occur in the women’s preference lists only, any tie is at the tail of some
woman’s list, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie has length 2, 4 or 5 (we discuss
in due course how to eliminate ties of length 4 and 5). Set K ′ = K + 11t. We claim that
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I has a stable matching of size at most K if and only if I ′ has a stable matching of size at
most K ′.
For, suppose that M is a stable matching in I, where |M | = k ≤ K. We construct a
matching M ′ in I ′ as follows. Each woman in W ′′ is unmatched in M ′ if she is unmatched
in M , otherwise she is given the same partner in M ′ as in M . Now let wj ∈ W
′. If
wj is unmatched in M , then add the pairs (pj,l, wj,l) (1 ≤ l ≤ 5), (pj,6, qj,5), (rj,l, qj,l)
(1 ≤ l ≤ 4) and (rj,5, sj) to M
′. Now suppose that wj is matched in M , to mi say. Then
mi = mkj,a for some a (1 ≤ a ≤ 6). Add (mi, wj,a) to M
′. For each l (1 ≤ l 6= a ≤ 6), add
the pair (pj,l, wj,l) to M
′. Add the pair (pj,a, qj,b) to M
′, where b = min{a, 5}. For each
l (1 ≤ l 6= b ≤ 5), add the pairs (rj,l, qj,l) to M
′. Finally, add the pair (rj,b, sj) to M
′.
Clearly M ′ is a matching in I ′, and |M ′| = k + 11t ≤ K ′.
It may be verified that, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ t), every person z ∈ Pj ∪ Qj ∪ Rj ∪ {sj}
is matched in M ′. Hence, by inspection of z’s preference list in I ′, we may deduce that
z cannot be involved in a blocking pair of M ′ in I ′. Clearly, if (mi, wj) blocks M
′ in I ′,
where wj ∈ W
′′, then (mi, wj) blocks M in I, a contradiction. Now suppose that (mi, wj,l)
blocks M ′ in I ′, where 1 ≤ l ≤ 6. Then wj,l is unmatched in M
′, so that l = 6 and wj
is unmatched in M . Since mi is not matched to any member of Wj in M
′, then (mi, wj)
blocks M in I, a contradiction. Hence M ′ is stable in I ′.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I ′, where M ′ = k′ ≤ K ′. It is easy
to see that, for every j (1 ≤ j ≤ t), each member of Pj ∪Qj ∪Rj ∪ {sj} must be matched
in M ′. We construct a matching M in I as follows. Each woman in W ′′ is unmatched in
M if she is unmatched in M ′, otherwise she is given the same partner in M as in M ′. Now
let wj ∈ W
′. If every member of Wj is matched in M
′, then some woman wj,l (1 ≤ l ≤ 6)
has a man mi ∈ Mj as her partner in M
′: let mi be the partner of wj in M . Otherwise,
let wj be unmatched in M . Clearly M is a matching in I, and |M | = k
′ − 11t ≤ K.
Now suppose that (mi, wj) blocks M in I. If wj ∈ W
′′, then (mi, wj) blocks M
′ in I ′,
a contradiction, so suppose that wj ∈W
′. Since wj ’s list in I comprises a single tie, then
wj is unmatched in M . Thus some wj,l (1 ≤ l ≤ 6) is unmatched in M
′. But then mi is
not matched to any member of Wj in M
′. Thus (mi, wj,l) blocks M
′ in I ′, a contradiction.
Hence M is stable in I.
Clearly I ′ contains ties of length 4 and 5. However, the construction of I ′ does not rely
on any special properties of the ties of length 6, and thus a similar reduction can be used
in order to replace the ties of length 5 in I ′ by ties of length 2 and 4 occupying different
women’s lists. (This method is applicable, since a woman in I ′ who has a tie of length 5 in
her list does not find any other men acceptable apart from the five tied men.) Similarly,
a further iteration will replace the ties of length 4 by ties of length 2 and 3 occupying
different women’s lists, and a final iteration will give an instance with ties of length 2 only.
Since the additional ties of length 2 that are generated at each stage appear only at the
tails of women’s lists, and there is at most one tie per list, then it is clear that we end
up with an instance which satisfies the restrictions of the statement of the theorem, and
furthermore, this instance can be constructed in polynomial time from I.
2.3 Approximability results
It turns out that, for a given instance I of HRT, each of the problems of finding stable
matching of minimum or maximum size is approximable within a factor of 2. This follows
immediately by choosing an arbitrary stable matching, and from the following result:
Theorem 2.5. For an arbitrary instance of HRT, the size of the largest stable matching
is at most twice the size of the smallest.
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Proof. Let I be an instance of HRT, and let M be a stable matching in I of maximum
cardinality. Suppose that M ′ is any stable matching in I, and suppose that |M ′| < |M |2 .
Then there is a set r1, . . . , rp of residents in I such that, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ p), rj is
unmatched in M ′ but matched in M , where p > |M ′|. As rj is matched in M (1 ≤ j ≤ p),
then there are p hospitals hi1 , . . . , hip (not necessarily distinct), such that rj is assigned
to hij in M (1 ≤ j ≤ p). Let k = |{hi1 , . . . , hip}| and let t be the sum of the capacities
of the k distinct hospitals. Each of the hospitals must be fully subscribed in M ′, for
otherwise some hospital hij (1 ≤ j ≤ p) has a vacancy in M
′, so that (rj , hij ) blocks M
′,
a contradiction. Thus |M ′| ≥ t. But t ≥ p, so |M ′| ≥ p, a contradiction.
2.4 Stable matchings interpolate
Given that the stable matchings in an instance of SMTI can be of different sizes, the
question arises as to whether there exist stable matchings of all sizes between the minimum
and maximum, i.e. whether stability in SMTI is an interpolating invariant. We remark
that the answer is in the affirmative; furthermore, given an SMTI instance and stable
matchings of sizes i, j, we may find in polynomial time a stable matching of size k, for
each i < k < j. The proof is omitted here; see [17] for further details.
3 Testing whether a (man,woman) pair is stable in SMT
In this section, we show that the problem of determining whether a given (man,woman)
pair (m, w) is stable in an instance I of SMT (i.e. whether there exists a stable matching
M in I such that (m, w) ∈ M) is NP-complete. Note that, when ties are absent, this
problem is polynomial-time solvable [5].
Theorem 3.1. For a given instance of SMT and a given (man,woman) pair (m, w), the
problem of determining whether (m, w) is a stable pair is NP-complete, even if the ties
occur at the tails of lists and on one side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each
tie is of length 2.
Proof. Clearly this problem is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we transform from the NP-
complete problem max cardinality smti when ties are at the tails of lists and on the
women’s side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2: let
U = {m1, m2, . . . , mn} be the set of men and let W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} be the set of
women in a given instance I of this problem. We may assume that the given target value
in I is equal to n. Let Pi (resp. Qi) denote the preference list of man mi (resp. woman
wi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (as mentioned in Section 1, without loss of generality we may assume
that for any man mi ∈ U and for any woman wj ∈ W , wj ∈ Pi if and only if mi ∈ Qj .)
We construct an instance I ′ of SMT as follows: let {m0} ∪ U be the set of men, and let
{w0} ∪W be the set of women. Create a preference list in I
′ for each person as follows:
m0 : w0 . . . w0 : . . . m0
mi : Pi w0 . . . (1 ≤ i ≤ n) wi : . . . Qi (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
The symbol ‘. . .’ in a person p’s preference list denotes all people in I ′ of the opposite sex
to p who are not explicitly listed elsewhere in p’s preference list, listed in arbitrary strict
order at the point where the symbol appears. Clearly the ties in I ′ occur at the tails of
lists and on the women’s side only, there is at most one tie per list, each tie is of length 2,
and all lists are complete. We claim that I has a complete stable matching if and only if
(m0, w0) is a stable pair in I
′.
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For, suppose that M is a complete stable matching for I. Let M ′ = M ∪ {(m0, w0)}.
We claim that M ′ is stable in I ′. For, if some pair (m, w) blocks M ′ then either m = m0
or w = w0, as M is stable in I. But m 6= m0, since m0 has his first-choice partner in
M ′. Hence w = w0, so that m = mi for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and mi strictly prefers w0 to
pM (mi). But pM (mi) appears on the list Pi, a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching for I ′, such that (m0, w0) ∈ M
′.
Clearly M ′ is a complete matching for I ′. Also, for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), we claim that
pM ′(mi) appears on the list Pi. For if not, then mi strictly prefers w0 to pM ′(mi). Since
w0 strictly prefers mi to m0 = pM ′(w0), then (mi, w0) blocks M
′, a contradiction. Hence,
for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), pM ′(wi) appears on the list Qi. Thus M = M
′\{(m0, w0)} is a
complete matching in I. Clearly M is stable in I.
It is straightforward to alter the above transformation in order to prove that deter-
mining whether a given person has a stable partner (i.e. has a partner in some stable
matching) in a given SMTI instance is also NP-complete.
4 Egalitarian and minimum regret stable matchings in SMT
In this section, we prove that each of the problems of finding an egalitarian and a minimum
regret stable matching for a given instance of SMT is NP-hard and difficult to approximate.
Given an SMT instance I, denote by w(I) the weight of an egalitarian stable match-
ing in I, and denote by r(I) the regret of a minimum regret stable matching in I. Let
egalitarian smt opt (respectively minimum regret smt opt) denote the optimisa-
tion problem which, given an instance I of SMT as its input, requires to output w(I)
(respectively r(I)) as a solution. We begin by proving that egalitarian smt opt is
NP-hard and hard to approximate.
Theorem 4.1. egalitarian smt opt is not approximable within N 1−ε, for any ε > 0,
unless P=NP, where N is the number of men in a given instance of the problem, even if
the ties are on one side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given, and let c = 3
ε
. We consider the NP-complete problem max
cardinality smti when ties occur on the women’s side only, and each tie is of length 2:
let U = {m1, m2, . . . , mn} be the set of men and let W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} be the set of
women in a given instance I of this problem. We may assume that the given target value
in I is equal to n. Let Pi (resp. Qi) denote the preference list of man mi (resp. woman
wi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We construct an instance I




be the set of men, and let W 0 ∪ (
⋃C
j=1 W
j) be the set of women, where C = nc−1,
U0 = {m01, m
0
2, . . . , m
0
nc}, U
j = {mj1, m
j
2, . . . , m
j
n} (1 ≤ j ≤ C), W 0 = {w01, w
0
2, . . . , w
0
nc},
and W j = {wj1, w
j
2, . . . , w
j
n} (1 ≤ j ≤ C). Thus I ′ comprises 2nc men and 2nc women, so
that N = 2nc. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ C), let P ji denote the preference
list that is obtained from Pi by replacing woman wk in Pi by the corresponding woman
wjk, for any k (1 ≤ k ≤ n). Let us refer to the women in P
j
i as the proper women for
mji . Define Q
j
i and the proper men for w
j









i [women in W
0] . . . (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ C)
w0i : m
0




i [men in U
0] . . . (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ C)
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Note that the symbol ‘. . .’ in the above preference lists has a similar meaning to its usage
in Theorem 3.1. Clearly the only ties featuring in I ′ occur in the preference lists of women
of the form wji , there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2.
Suppose that M is a stable matching in I, where |M | = n. We form a matching M ′
in I ′ as follows: for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ nc), add the pair (m0i , w
0
i ) to M
′, and for each i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), add the pair (mji , w
j
k) to M
′ (1 ≤ j ≤ C), where (mi, wk) ∈ M . Clearly M
′
is stable in I ′, and it may be verified that





since we may choose n ≥ 3, without loss of generality. Hence w(I ′) ≤ nc+2.
Now suppose that I does not have a stable matching of cardinality n. Let M ′ be any
stable matching in I ′. Then it may be verified that, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ C), there is some
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) such that mji cannot be matched in M
′ to one of his proper women. But
in M ′, m0k and w
0
k must be partners, for each k (1 ≤ k ≤ n
c), and hence cM ′(m
j
i ) > n
c.
Similarly, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ C), there is some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) such that wji cannot be
matched in M ′ to one of her proper men, and hence cM ′(w
j
i ) > n
c. Thus w(M ′) > 2n2c−1,
so that w(I ′) > 2n2c−1.
Hence the existence of a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for egalitarian
smt opt whose approximation ratio is as good as (2n2c−1)/nc+2 = 2nc−3 would give
a polynomial-time algorithm for determining whether I has a stable matching in which








c = N1−ε, which concludes the
proof.
Note that in general, the hardness of finding an egalitarian stable matching in no way
implies the hardness of finding a minimum regret stable matching: for example, in the case
of Stable Roommates, although the problem of finding an egalitarian stable matching is
NP-hard [2], the problem of finding a minimum regret stable matching is polynomial-time
solvable [9]. Nevertheless, it turns out that minimum regret smt opt has similar approx-
imability behaviour to egalitarian smt opt. In fact, the transformation of Theorem
4.1 can be adapted in a straightforward fashion to prove a result analogous to Theorem
4.1 for minimum regret smt opt, as we now demonstrate.
Theorem 4.2. minimum regret smt opt is not approximable within N 1−ε, for any
ε > 0, unless P=NP, where N is the number of men in a given instance of the problem,
even if the ties are on one side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of
length 2.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given. We consider the SMT instance I ′ constructed in Theorem 4.1
from the max cardinality smti instance I. In order to prove the inapproximability re-
sult for minimum regret smt opt, it suffices to take c = 2
ε
and C = 1 in the construction
of I ′. Hence there are n + nc men and n + nc women in I ′, so that N = n + nc.
Suppose that M is a stable matching in I, where |M | = n. We construct a matching
M ′ in I ′ as follows: for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ nc), add the pair (m0i , w
0
i ) to M
′, and for each i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), add the pair (m1i , w
1
k) to M
′, where (mi, wk) ∈ M . Clearly M
′ is stable in I ′,
and r(M ′) ≤ n. Hence r(I ′) ≤ n.
Now suppose that I does not have a stable matching of cardinality n. Let M ′ be any
stable matching in I ′. Then as in Theorem 4.1, there is some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) such that
cM ′(m
1
i ) > n
c. Thus r(M ′) > nc, so that r(I ′) > nc.
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Hence the existence of a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for minimum re-
gret smt opt whose approximation ratio is as good as nc/n = nc−1 would give a
polynomial-time algorithm for determining whether I has a stable matching in which
everybody is matched. Finally, nc−1 > n(c+1)(1−ε) ≥ (n + nc)(1−ε) = N1−ε (without loss
of generality, n ≥ 2), which concludes the proof.
Note that, for a given instance I of HRT and a stable matching M in I, a more suitable
definition of cM (h) for a hospital h might be the sum of the (possibly joint) rankings of
each resident designated to h in h’s list, divided by the capacity of h. Clearly each of the
inapproximability results of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 carries over to this revised definition,
by considering the restriction of HRT in which each hospital has capacity one, and the
numbers of posts and residents are equal.
5 Conclusion and open problems
In this paper, we have established the hardness of various problems involving stable match-
ings in the case where the preference lists of the participants may be incomplete and may
involve ties. Among these is the important practical problem of finding a stable matching
of maximum cardinality for an HRT instance in which all of the ties are on one side (the
hospitals’ side), and are at the tails of lists, and there is at most one tie per list (and even
if each tie is of length 2).
A number of interesting open problems remain. These include:
• Is there an approximation algorithm for finding a stable matching of maximum
cardinality in SMTI (and HRT) with a guarantee better than 2? Perhaps some
special cases, say with restrictions on the positions or size of ties, may be more
accessible.
• Is the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum size APX-complete?
• Is there a reasonable algorithm to generate all of the stable matchings for a given
instance of SMTI (and HRT)? For each of SM and HR, such an algorithm can be
derived by exploiting the underlying lattice structure [5], but there appears to be no
such useful mathematical structure present in SMTI or HRT: Roth [20] constructs
an instance of SMT, comprising three men and three women, which admits no man-
optimal or woman-optimal stable matching.
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